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Efficient breach |
Efficient breach refers to an intentional breach of contract and payment of damages by a party who would incur greater economic loss by performing under the contract.
According to Black's Law Dictionary, efficient breach theory is "the view that a party should be allowed to breach a contract and pay damages, if doing so would be more economically efficient than performing under the contract."
The first statement of the theory of efficient breach appears to have been made in a law review article by Robert Birmingham in "Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L.Rev. 273, 284 (1970) (“Repudiation of obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered”). The theory was named by Charles Goetz and Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 554 (1977).
Efficient Breach Theory is associated with Richard Posner and the Law and Economics school of thought. It has been used to defend the traditional common law rule that a non-tortious breach of contract cannot be remedied by punitive damages and penal damages (unreasonably excessive liquidated damages that are seen as a punishment for breach rather than a remedy). Such penalties would discourage efficient breach (therefore discouraging efficient behavior) and possibly put companies at increased risk of bankruptcy, which would be very bad for society. Posner explains his views in his majority opinion in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
Judge Richard Posner gave this well-known illustration of efficient breach in "Economic Analysis of Law":
Suppose I sign a contract to deliver 100,000 custom-ground widgets at $.10 apiece to A, for use in his boiler factory. After I have delivered 10,000, B comes to me, explains that he desperately needs 25,000 custom-ground widgets at once since otherwise he will be forced to close his pianola factory at great cost, and offers me $.15 apiece for 25,000 widgets. I sell him the widgets and as a result do not complete timely delivery to A, who sustains $1000 in damages from my breach. Having obtained an additional profit of $1250 on the sale to B, I am better off even after reimbursing A for his loss. Society is also better off. Since B was willing to pay me $.15 per widget, it must mean that each widget was worth at least $.15 to him. But it was worth only $.14 to A – $.10, what he paid, plus $.04 ($1000 divided by 25,000), his expected profit. Thus the breach resulted in a transfer of the 26,000 widgets from a lower valued to a higher valued use.
Some have argued that morally, A is obligated to honor a contract made with B because A has made a promise. (See, for example, Charles Fried's "Contract as Promise.")(“The moralist of duty thus posits a general obligation to keep promises, of which the obligation of contract will only be a special case – that special case in which certain promises have attained legal as well as moral force.”)
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